THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

PROPAGANDA STUDIES

Edited by

JONATHAN AUERBACH

and

RUSS CASTRONOVO

OXFORD

Trysh Travis is an associate professor teaching at the Center for Women's Studies and Gender Research at the University of Florida. Her first book, *The Language of the Heart: A Cultural History of the Recovery Movement from Alcoholics Anonymous to Oprah Winfrey,* was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2009; her current book project is *Reading Matters: Books, Bookmen, and the American Century, 1930–1980.*

Katherine Vaughn is a masters in public policy and MBA dual degree candidate at the School of Public Policy and RH Smith School of Business, respectively, at the University of Maryland College Park. Katherine has co-authored a series of articles on social media use in the Arab uprisings, and she conducted a research study on the constraints of women entrepreneurs in Morocco.

Priscilla Wald is professor of English at Duke University where she edits *American Literature.* She is the author of *Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form* and *Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative.* She is currently at work on a book-length study tentatively entitled *Human Being after Genocide.*

Mark Wollaeger is professor of English at Vanderbilt University. He is author of *Joseph Conrad and the Fictions of Skepticism* (1990) and *Modernism, Media, and Propaganda: British Narrative from 1900 to 1945* (2006), as well as editor of two collections of essays on Joyce and the *Oxford Handbook of Global Modernisms* (2012). He served as president of the Modernist Studies Association and is a founding co-editor, with Kevin J. H. Dettmar, of *Modernist Literature & Culture,* an Oxford University Press book series.

Marcus Wood is a painter, performance artist, and filmmaker. Since 2003 he has also been a professor of English at the University of Sussex. His books include *Blind Memory: Visual Representations of Slavery in England and America 1780–1865* (Manchester University Press and Routledge, 2000); *Slavery, Empathy and Pornography* (Oxford University Press, 2003); and *The Horrible Gift of Freedom: Atlantic Slavery and the Representation of Emancipation* (University of Georgia Press, 2010).

David Yanagizawa-Drott is an assistant professor of public policy at Harvard University. His research interests include economic development and political economy, with special focus on civil conflict, health, information, and mass media. He holds a PhD in economics from Stockholm University and has published in the *Journal of the European Economic Association* and the *European Journal of Political Economy.*

INTRODUCTION: THIRTEEN PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PROPAGANDA

JONATHAN AUERBACH AND
RUSS CASTRONOVO

THE scope of propaganda is biblical. God's injunction against spreading false reports prompted subsequent commentators to caution against "propagators of calumny" whose sin consists in sowing seeds of dissension and suspicion that prevent the establishment of peace on earth.[1] "Thou shall not publish" would be a serviceable translation of the original Hebrew of Exodus 23:1, according to a nineteenth-century theologian. A generation before, John Wesley had glossed this verse to explain that the divine prohibition included not simply the spreading of rumors but also their receipt. The truth or falsity of the message is only half of what Moses is instructed to adjudicate. Equally if not more significant are the positions along an ancient media chain connecting senders and receivers. Linking each end of this communications circuit is an array of activities whose appearance may be an everyday event but whose power is immense: dissemination, circulation, and, of course, propagation.

Not that these activities were themselves sinful. More than a millennium after Moses received warning about the "propagators of calumny," the Catholic Church invested the concept and practice of propaganda with its modern meanings, specifically the idea of global distribution. In 1622 to counter the widening influence of the Reformation, Pope Gregory XV charged a group of cardinals with the mission of spreading the faith worldwide. In his *Inscrutabili Divinae,* a document that is translated in the first chapter of this volume, the pope called for an organization dedicated to propaganda, not to distort information or proliferate lies but to disseminate what he and other believers took to be

with conquest. Less frequently, the idea also entailed horticultural practice of promoting the growth, reproduction, and multiplication of plants by means of slips, shoots, and cuttings. As a cultural practice, propaganda concerns nothing less than the ways in which human beings communicate, particularly with respect to the creation and widespread dissemination of attitudes, images, and beliefs. In this way, the study of propaganda has tremendous relevance for art history, history, theology, communications, education, media studies, public relations, literary analysis, rhetoric, cultural theory, and political science. Precisely because propaganda cuts across so many fields both in the humanities and social sciences, it deserves renewed and sustained scrutiny, promising to invigorate and be invigorated by overlapping concepts such as ideology, publicity, and indoctrination that may have played themselves out in more traditional disciplines.

While we draw on research from these various other academic subjects, we urge that propaganda be considered a field of study in its own right. Far-ranging in its implications, propaganda as a coherent practice or set of practices lends itself to focused inquiry insofar as it possesses a distinct genesis and a rich history that helps us make sense of how information circulates today. Before the bitter experience of World War I saddled understandings of propaganda with sinister connotations, the concept carried more open-ended meanings. And yet the association of propaganda with malevolent forms of persuasion seemed well deserved in light of the outpouring of fake atrocity stories and patriotic spectacles that had led nations and individuals into a protracted war of particularly chilling efficiency from 1914 to 1919. These connotations were to be confirmed just a few decades later when the Nazi Reich made propaganda a vehicle for promoting invasion and genocide. This volume is profoundly attentive to these catastrophic events of the twentieth century and it includes other chapters in this dark history from the Soviet Union of the Stalin era, China in the wake of the massacre of pro-democracy forces at Tiananmen Square, and Rwanda during the frenzy of "hate radio."

Often used strictly as a dismissive term, especially by one enemy against another, propaganda can more neutrally be understood as a central means of organizing and shaping thought and perception, a practice that has pervaded the twentieth century but whose modern origins go back at least to the spread of religious doctrine during the Counter Reformation. Of course, though, persuasion has been around for a far longer time, and debates over its uses and ethics date as far back as the classical face-off over rhetoric between Socrates and the Sophists. While Plato's *Gorgias* voices doubts over the morality of persuasion—is it merely a knack for appealing to emotion and creating unfounded judgments?—it is significant for our purposes that this dialogue does not really weigh in on the scale of such persuasion, nor the material means by which rhetoric is enacted. Orators in classical antiquity certainly addressed audiences, but they did so without the aid of megaphones, the printing press, radio signals, or the networks of the Internet. In this light, the truly modern feature of the Pope's 1622 call for propagation is the provision that the Vatican's post office would facilitate the transmission of the true faith. It is ... propaganda requires institutions and media

to a more secular set of institutions. Throughout Europe starting around 1790, the term was invoked both by radicals eager to advance the gospel of Reason and by anti-revolutionaries who feared that "Propaganda," imagined as a metaphoric monster created by "vile Innovators," was spawning social discord across the globe.[2] In this emerging political context, propaganda became the basis for a new way of conceiving civil society, with the widespread circulation of ideas embracing universal liberty and equality at its center. Such revolutionary upheaval quickly became linked with propaganda's role in orchestrating conflict, as Georg Lukács first noted in the 1930s:

> In its defensive struggle against the coalition of absolute monarchies, the French Republic was compelled to create mass armies. The qualitative difference between mercenary and mass armies is precisely a question of their relations with the mass of the population. If in place of the recruitment or pressing into professional service of small contingents of the declassed, a mass army is to be created, then the content and purpose of the war must be made clear to the masses by means of propaganda. . . . Such propaganda cannot possibly, however, restrict itself to the individual, isolated war. It has to reveal the social content, the historical presuppositions and circumstances of the struggle, to connect up the war with the entire life and possibilities of the nation's development.[3]

Here the massification of men's bodies into armies parallels the mass dissemination of nationalistic and ideological appeals to go to war, a pattern repeated over and over again for the next two hundred years, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces. As Lukács's word "possibilities" suggests, there dwells a humanitarian or perhaps even a utopian hint in this kind of revelatory propaganda, as we can see by turning to a visual example (figure I.1).

This image, designed and deployed by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command during the invasion, strikes an emotional chord to play upon the supposed universality of parental feeling by presenting the most vulnerable members of Iraqi society—children—as exposed to malignant influence from terrorists. Like the propaganda of the French Republic, this U.S. Army leaflet is directed at a civilian population. But there exists a crucial difference. The mass appeal to Iraqis comes from outside the nation by a foreign, occupying power. The internal, domestic propaganda of France in the 1790s seems straightforward compared to the linguistic and cultural translations that necessarily frame the dissemination of U.S. propaganda within the borders of Iraq. Not only does an American message have to be rendered in Arabic. It has to be communicated within the codes of post-Hussein society, a discourse that requires an appreciation of its people and its history. The elder's hand that rests on the boy's red shirt bears a tattoo that many Iraqis would recognize as a marking borne by now-liberated inmates of the regime's prisons, suggesting a continuity between the abuses of Hussein and the abuses of the insurgents. Shot from a child's point of view, the latent content of the image readily becomes manifest even for the casual observer. The aggressive sexual-



Figure I.1 U.S. Army propaganda leaflet

And so a humanitarian analogy takes hold: just as children require protection from terrorists, Iraqi society will benefit from the watchful presence of the U.S. military, positioned as the eye of the low-angle camera, but nowhere to be seen in the staged image itself. This resonant piece of American propaganda sympathetically seeks to insinuate itself into the inner life of the Iraqi nation, its hopes for the future as embodied by its children ("our children" in the upper declarative sentence, and "your children" in the lower imperative one). By this interplay of image and text, the leaflet aims "to reveal the social content, the historical presuppositions and circumstances" (to recall Lukács's phrasing) of the struggle in Iraq.

Appreciating how propaganda may serve as a fruitful means of social analysis is one core conviction among many that underlie this collection of essays. Although these assumptions are concretely borne out in the course of these individual essays themselves, we feel it is useful to put our cards on the table from the start by spelling out our approach to the study of propaganda. We therefore offer a series of related propositions about propaganda. These propositions are intended to be expansive and suggestive rather than definitive, helping to move forward a topic that all too often has been bogged down and narrowed by categorical and repetitious preconceptions. If our formulations

1. *Propaganda is not intrinsically evil or immoral.* Working as a radio broadcaster during World War II for the Overseas Service of the BBC, George Orwell raised a seeming paradox: "All propaganda is lies, even when one is telling the truth" (diary entry, March 14, 1942). Orwell grasped that the veracity of any given statement was not the central question in assessing propaganda. He instead relocated the problem at a more serious level by damning all acts of propagation as fundamentally fraudulent. But as we have already suggested, this virtually automatic commonplace that propaganda is inherently dishonest and deceitful emerged directly from the practice of propaganda itself, specifically the charges and counter charges made between Germany and its enemies during and in the aftermath of World War I. Yet the existence of the concept and practice of propaganda prior to the Great War for nearly three hundred years suggests a more benign history, with the concept linked to mass movements such as suffrage, the abolition of slavery, and environmental conservation. Of course we cannot turn back the clock to restore propaganda to its pristine state before the global violence of the twentieth century. But appreciating how powerfully pejorative assumptions about the concept emerged at a particular historical moment that saw the convergence of modern warfare and modern media allows us to rethink the practice and to reorient propaganda studies in possibly new directions. That is why we propose to begin by treating propaganda not as a term of disrepute, but simply as a mode of mass persuasion, neither good nor evil, that can be enlisted for a variety of purposes and with a variety of results.[4]
2. *Propaganda entails propagation, but not everything that propagates is necessarily propaganda.* This point may seem obvious, but it is worth emphasizing that an image or argument, not matter how powerful and compelling, remains inert unless it is engaged by an audience. Boxes of stirring pamphlets sitting unread in a warehouse do not propaganda make. Nor does a video documenting the brutal tactics of an authoritarian regime—unless it is uploaded to YouTube and begins receiving hundreds of hits a day. Propaganda is a mass phenomenon; it must circulate in public, reaching and drawing together large numbers of individuals who are largely unknown to one another. Personal exchanges among intimates often are constituted by a variety of rhetorical appeals, but this sort of persuasive communication is on an insufficient scale to be usefully examined as propaganda. And yet not everything that is disseminated widely in public lends itself to analysis as a piece of propaganda. Weather forecasts, for example, can reach thousands of people at once through radio, press, and Internet, but unlike other sorts of news, these forecasts usually carry only negligible persuasive force. Of course a weather forecast, or more likely a succession of forecasts, could be enlisted for propaganda purposes, as in debates concerning climate change.
3. *The relation between propaganda and information is fluid, varying according to context and function.* As our previous example suggests, information about the

readily indicates that the line between information and propaganda is variable and unstable. Propaganda is not a fixed entity with a predetermined set of characteristics that can be identified in isolation. Rather than reify propaganda by searching for its intrinsic properties, we take a pragmatist approach that leads to a functional definition: publicly disseminated information that serves to influence others in belief and/or action. Whether it makes sense to regard a particular piece of widely circulated information as propaganda or not depends on its use. And whether that information is factual or not is also mostly moot (as Orwell observed), since facts never exist in a vacuum but are framed by the discourse in which they are embedded. Data about rising ocean temperatures as reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration signify and circulate very differently on a website such as JunkScience.com. Truth claims are indeed claims and cannot be abstracted from the rhetoric of assertion. Acts of mass persuasion are tied to specific practices of propagation and circumstances of reception. Even if sinister motives are imputed from the start, propaganda as it spreads over time may do more than merely mislead or manipulate.

4. *Although propaganda is not an essential category with precise formal attributes, particular techniques of propagation can be studied with variable results.* As opposed to identifying characteristics of propaganda that endure forever and across culture, our task is to scrutinize the rhetorical or visual packaging that allows information to appeal to broad audiences, to examine how such information influences people, and to pay critical attention to its patterns of dissemination and circulation. This approach is fundamentally different from studies of propaganda that seek to establish a set of generalized guidelines or rules for recognizing (and thus disarming) propaganda. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA), for instance, was an American organization founded in 1937 with the purpose of countering the perceived assault on the individual's capacity for free thought. It devoted its activities toward producing a monthly bulletin "to help the intelligent citizen detect and analyze propaganda" within motion pictures, daily newspapers, and radio broadcasts.[5] IPA bulletins closed with a regular feature, "Suggested Activities and Discussion Notes," that encouraged citizens to exercise suspicion about the media they consumed so that they could spot various propaganda ploys—"card stacking," "name calling," "glittering generalities"—that coincided with the march of fascism in the 1930s. The limit of this sort of investigation, in contrast to our approach, consists in the fixation upon propaganda as a set of features that can be decoded and demystified. While getting people to pay attention to particular rhetorical devices and tactics might have its advantages, it is unclear how and whether such formal exercises could produce vigilant, fully informed, and engaged citizens in the long run; in fact such an emphasis on decoding might have given people the false impression that they were immune to more subtle and diffused strategies of persuasion.

advertising, and literature. This is the central crux of these propositions and of our volume as a whole. Over and over again in these essays, the practice of propaganda is intimately connected to a host of parallel institutions, which in turn are carefully situated in their historical, national, and cultural contexts. Rather than isolate propaganda as a thing unto itself, this approach fruitfully links mass persuasion to teaching, preaching, selling, publicizing, and other analogous rhetorical modes that work in a similar vein. Not until 1982 did the Vatican rename the Congregatio de propaganda fide, continuing the propagation of the faith under the name of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples. And since 1701 the Church of England had been operating its own Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts to convert pagans (including dissenting white settlers) in the New World. Whereas religious institutions thus have tended to be explicit about their propaganda, educational institutions often have been skittish about their proximity to propaganda. Indeed, charges of education as indoctrination or propaganda routinely flare up in debates over educational policy, public school curricula, and textbook adoption. The field of advertising perhaps has been most successful in disavowing its propaganda past despite the fact that early pioneers in the field considered propaganda and advertising synonymous. Whether by way of imitation, fine distinctions, disavowal, or dialectics, the relations between propaganda and these parallel institutions require close and sustained attention.

6. *Propaganda changes according to specific media, but cannot entirely be defined by the attributes of a given medium.* Taking into consideration our emphasis on scales of dissemination, it becomes obvious that not all media work identically. Even though radio was initially conceived as a means of communication between individuals, for instance, it quickly developed into a model of one-to-many broadcast, as did television following soon after, both almost always subsidized and run by either large corporations and/or national governments. The Internet and print (to a lesser extent), by contrast, more easily allow individuals to spread information widely although one would never want to deny the heavy imprint of corporate influence. On a more general level, how audiences process words differs markedly from how they process images, which tend to operate more rapidly and affectively, engaging different senses and different parts of the brain. So the specific media channels that convey information profoundly shape what messages can be sent and how they are received. Yet such inclination toward technological determinism has its drawbacks in a world of media convergence and remediation.[6] Words and images are often translated or carried over from one medium to another in ways that often enhance rather than diminish the force of persuasion. Focusing on one medium instead of the interplay of several media risks losing sight of the ways in which broadly based narratives cut across media to mutually reinforce each other. The figure of the brutish black rapist was

cartoons, and the speeches of Senator "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman worked hand in glove to solidify this stereotype, which loomed larger and more powerfully than any one of its many media iterations. In this particular case, the medium is distinctly not the entire message.

7. *Propaganda in its effects can be partial, and it need not be total.* Totalitarian regimes maximize power by extending their control beyond the domain of the strictly political and into culture, education, and religion. In North Korea under Kim Jong-un or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the state harnessed such institutions as the press, television, schools, sports, and health care in an effort to expand its propaganda activities into all aspects of life. Situations of total propaganda are rare, however. Dictatorial societies may not require the gentle suasion of propaganda since forceful coercion remains a tried and proven tactic in these settings. More commonly, however, in either totalitarian societies or democratic ones, propaganda is partial in its effects. Take radio, for example. All sorts of material and subjective conditions make radio a partial phenomenon. Transmissions can be blocked by mountains or compromised by a weak signal so that a broadcast fails to reach everyone in a potential audience. Other recipients who are squarely within the broadcast zone may not turn on their radios. Some people may have the radio on but will listen to a different station (assuming there is more than one that can be received). Others who have dialed into the right station may be distracted and not really listening or understanding. Still others may tune in and follow closely but without agreeing. Propaganda, in this last instance, is partial because there remains within individuals a core of subjectivity that cannot be completely overwritten or entirely internalized by disseminated information, despite theorists who might suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, propaganda, even in moderate or partial doses, is often potent enough to sway subjects and to convince them to adopt beliefs and commit actions that they would not otherwise consent to without the influence of mass persuasion.

8. *Analyzing propaganda requires paying as much attention to networks of information flow (how) as the content (what).* Whether it is a colonial American broadside or a politically charged webpage, the manner in which propaganda spreads and circulates is just as significant as the information that it imparts. The content of propaganda does not exist apart from its modes of transmission. In this regard, propaganda analysis differs from ideological critique, which typically strives to unmask the ideological meanings hidden within a speech, painting, or other cultural artifact. Such critique starts from the presumption that ideology instills people with a false understanding of the world. Without a doubt, much of what is categorized as propaganda relies on deceptive messages, faked information, and/or exaggerated claims. But it is not the single piece of propaganda that needs analysis. Instead, what matters are the systems of

other websites. In this sense, the novelty of Tom Paine's *Common Sense* (1776) was not bound up with what it said since this propaganda pamphlet more or less repackaged ideas about natural rights that were already familiar. Precisely because he said nothing new about government, his ideas were easily received. But what was innovative was *how* those ideas migrated to taverns, inns, and coffeehouses where even illiterate Americans heard the simple language of his argument read aloud and discussed. Paine's anonymously published pamphlet was compatible with the established idioms of religion, commerce, and science so that it was quickly sent flowing across large swaths of the population. *Common Sense* acquired revolutionary meaning insofar as it moved courtesy via not only a network of Whig printers and correspondents but also Tory counterattacks that kept its ideas in circulation. Soon a half-million copies, according to Paine's estimate, were circulating in the colonies. It was these factors—and nothing intrinsic to Paine's arguments about monarchy—that made *Common Sense* the most important pamphlet of the Age of Revolution.

9. *People can actively use propaganda and are not simply passive dupes used by it. Propaganda does not necessarily spread from the top down.* Twentieth-century studies of propaganda generally view the populace as putty, easily shaped and molded by master manipulators. Even before the undeniable specter of fascism encouraged this view, the image of a citizenry as "formless block" awaiting the practiced hand of a sculptor of the state who "does not hesitate to do it violence" had been present in Friedrich Schiller's work on aesthetic education.[7] Later research on crowd psychology, principally by Gustave Le Bon, solidified this idea that people could be misled by words and images into performing actions as a group that they would never commit individually. According to this map, power and influence flow vertically, seeking the lowest elevation and following the course of least resistance. These valleys are, of course, inhabited by the unthinking mass. Yet this view changes with the recognition that social and political landscapes are more varied and complex. People consume propaganda, but they also produce and package their own information just as they also create and spin their own truths. Of course, however, these remain only potential truths unless they are handed out as a leaflet, plastered on walls as a poster, conveyed across the airwaves, or uploaded as a video. It is worthwhile remembering as well that access to these media is often limited by expense, literacy, or a lack of technological resources, and that those who first acquire information usually have an advantage in controlling it. By deciding whether or not to remove an incendiary YouTube video, for example, a company like Google owning a private platform may exercise more command over free speech and the public commons than governments themselves. But it is also worth noting that the Church, the state, and corporate interests often compete rather than support one another, and taken together they do not have a total lock upon the means of propagation. There

and lively series of pamphlets speculating about the sexual escapades of Marie Antoinette helped fuel indignation against the ancien régime. Likewise, there was more than one Twitter account relaying messages in Tahrir Square during the popular protests for regime change in Egypt in 2011. Because the people are never just a singular entity, multiple points of dissemination come into focus when propaganda is understood as a more horizontal form of communication.

10. *Propaganda can produce unintended effects beyond the control of both producers and receivers.* The study of propaganda does not neatly fit a conventional communications model that posits a producer at one end, a receiver at the other, and a message in the middle, with the emphasis for the most part falling on the agency of producers, and to a lesser extent, on the susceptibility of audiences to the machinations of propagandists. This is an inadequate model for a number of reasons. First, propagandists may operate without a clear intention or even message beyond a vague inclination to stir things up, and yet still generate profound effects. Especially in cyberspace, tidbits of rhetoric can quickly become massively amplified and distorted. Second, this model tends to overlook how during the circulation of discourse along nodes and networks, the roles of senders and receivers can change places, so that a person who reads or hears something becomes a kind of active producer in passing that information on (often in altered form) to somebody else. Third, in focusing on the deliberate aims of producers, this model neglects the promiscuous, dynamic nature of information once it reaches a public. An image designed to produce a single effect can provoke a range of unanticipated responses. Plastered (by state sanction) on every market stall, iconic photos of former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali clasping his hands together in a show of warmth and power were clearly intended to induce worshipful respect. But instead they became the target of mockery by many Tunisian citizens, who enjoyed glossing the smiling dictator's gesture as "give me your money." This jab was certainly not the message intended by the state propagandists. Yet it would be equally dubious to assume that by this kind of creative reinterpretation, citizens wrested control of Ben Ali's image from the state, since for years such cynical jokes could only be uttered as private asides.

11. *To be effective, propaganda must harness a rich affective range beyond negative emotions such as hatred, fear, and envy to include more positive feelings such as pleasure, joy, belonging, and pride.* Here we are indebted to the political theorizing of Slavoj Žižek, who has analyzed the operations of ideology; for Žižek "*ideology has nothing to do with 'illusion,'* with a mistaken, distorted representation of its social content," since people usually are able quite effortlessly to see through tissues of lies.[8] Shifting from a cognitive register to a psychological one, Žižek emphasizes how ideology works by affect, fulfilling a comforting function to protect us from the overwhelming chaos of undifferentiated signification. We

the 1960s Jacques Ellul made a similar point about propaganda, echoing earlier assessments by Walter Lippmann in the 1920s that the public dissemination of information had grown too complex and confusing for citizens to master on their own. For both Lippmann and Ellul, this need for order and security in the face of such media saturation carried primarily negative associations, exposing the vulnerability and alienation of modern life. As a result, people were perpetually at the mercy of bogus truth claims and demonized depictions of adversaries. But for public relations guru Edward Bernays (Sigmund Freud's nephew), also writing in the 1920s, the yearning for clarity instead bespeaks the importance of desire in shaping our beliefs. Appreciating desire as a central fact of capitalism, Bernays unrepentantly sought to understand and tap the underlying psychic mechanisms that motivate consumers to buy commodities. Like Žižek after him, he appreciated how such forces of desire were linked to pleasure, which in the rush to deem mass persuasion as manipulative, deceitful, and immoral, has been a dimension largely overlooked in propaganda studies since World War I.

12. *Propaganda is an integral feature of democratic societies.* "Invent the printing press and democracy is inevitable," commented Thomas Carlyle. Hardly a ringing endorsement of popular government, Carlyle's statement rather concerns how the invention of moveable type increased the range and speed of information so that now an entire people could become the target of persuasion. John Dewey in 1927 found Carlyle's words prophetic and riffed, "Invent the railway, the telegraph, mass manufacture and concentration of population in urban centers, and some form of democratic government is, humanly speaking, inevitable."[9] Modern history had proved at least the first half of Dewey's statement. Sophisticated distribution techniques and expansive communication networks had indeed galvanized the U.S. population, not strictly for greater self-rule, but to acquiesce to joining a war in Europe. As to the second half of his statement (interrupted by that cagey, colloquial phrase "humanly speaking" that would seem to cut against the grain of technological determinism), it is not democracy but the inevitability of information flow that bears comment. From a less optimistic perspective than Dewey's, Walter Lippmann in the aftermath of the Great War analyzed how such flow contributed to what he called "the manufacture of consent."[10] If the sloganeering justification for entering the conflict was "to make the world safe for democracy," the production of wartime propaganda ensured that the population would agree to this interpretation of events. And so in our own day we might write: Invent the television, the cellular phone, and the Internet. . . . We would like to say that democracy will ensue, but it seems a safer bet to merely say that the only sure thing to follow will be more and more vigorous attempts to actively shape public opinion.

13. *The study of propaganda remains highly relevant and in all likelihood will continue to be a critical issue in the future.* Increasing globalization and growth

to twenty-four-hour news cycles, the virtually instantaneous posting of cell phone videos on YouTube, the emergence of citizen journalists would all seem to combine to spell the end of propaganda as we know it. Models of propaganda that describe how media conglomerates and governments work together to create systemic biases have lost some of their pertinence. Even though there is clearly no longer any sort of monopoly over information, we cannot be lulled into thinking that information is now open and free for all. Despite the proliferation of newer technologies of knowledge, there still exist stark asymmetries, particularly in the economic sphere, between what some people can comprehend and use to their advantage and what others cannot: consider exotic financial instruments such as subprime derivatives, for instance. Operating in such exhilarating if confusing emergent media environments, mass persuasion continues to influence people's beliefs and actions in ways that merit careful examination. Face-to-face models of communication are inadequate for understanding how propaganda works today, although of course feelings of intimacy can be easily conveyed online. The increasing difficulty of pinpointing the origins, causality, and agency of widely disseminated information makes it all the more imperative to attempt to trace the webs of power and capital that make up what has been called the "the network society."[11] We upload and watch, we read and post, we google and are spammed, becoming relays along these networks in ways that blur the distinction between the production and the consumption of information. To the extent that ordinary citizens are caught up by and occupy force fields of mass persuasion, propaganda matters and will continue to matter.

Abstract propositions remain just that unless they are put to the test. Although the twenty-two original essays that make up this collection are diverse in subject matter and approach and were written without a single controlling agenda, they do engage many of the ideas put forward in our introduction. While each presents a self-contained argument, we grouped them (in sets of seven or eight) into three overarching units or sections designed to give the volume as a whole a distinct shape: Histories and Nationalities (part I), Institutions and Practices (part II), and Theories and Methodologies (part III). As with our propositions, this scheme of organization is also meant to be heuristic and provisional, taking into account the complexity and richness of propaganda studies as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry.

In keeping with our volume's deep commitment to historical contextualizing, we begin our first section of essays with Pope Gregory XV's *Inscrutabili Divinae* (1622), fully translated from Latin into modern English for the first time by Thomas and Maria Teresa Prendergast. This papal bull is crucial because it introduced the word "propaganda" to refer to the spreading of divine truth to the faithful. As the incisive commentary accompanying the translation indicates, the key term and its cognates move back and forth between older meanings that suggest the activity of conquest and extending

its profound grounding in religious indoctrination would continue to resonate well into the nineteenth century, as Marcus Wood demonstrates in his essay comparing North American and Brazilian antislavery polemics. Focusing on the distinctly exhibitionist features of Brazilian verbal and visual abolitionism, Wood reveals how such rhetoric worked by a striking combination of fetishism, martyrology, and syncretic religion. Post slavery, the relation between propaganda and race is explored by Bill Mullen, who argues that African American intellectuals such as W.E.B. Du Bois in the early part of the twentieth century understood the role of writing to be inherently propagandistic in order to challenge white supremacist thought and practice around the globe.

The necessary blurring between art and propaganda that Du Bois embraced to promote black internationalism finds a contemporaneous parallel in Bolshevik efforts to advance social realism during the 1920s and 1930s. As Elizabeth Papazian argues in her essay analyzing Dziga Vertov's film *Three Songs of Lenin*, culture under Stalin was conceived as an all-encompassing transformative project aspiring to construct a new Soviet subject, at once enlightening and controlling its citizens. In the 1930s a program of cultural indoctrination by saturation was also conducted by the Nazis, whose propaganda campaign against the Jewish enemy was not simply a case of convenient scapegoating, as Jeffrey Herf demonstrates, but absolutely central to German National Socialist ideology. Mind control takes on a different valence after World War II in the United States, with anxieties about brainwashing permeating debates about mass persuasion in relation to an emerging public relations industry. These anxieties were at the heart of Cold War psycho-politics, as Priscilla Wald explores in her essay discussing the novel and film versions of *The Manchurian Candidate*. The Cold War also saw in the sphere of foreign relations the emergence of "public diplomacy," a euphemistic coinage introduced in the 1960s as a kind of soft propaganda that sought to shape and direct America's image and influence abroad, according to Nicholas Cull, who traces the development of institutions and agencies dedicated to American public diplomacy in the last four decades of the twentieth century. Public diplomacy, both domestic and international, has recently become a key concern for contemporary China as well, argues Gary Rawnsley in his essay. In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Chinese leaders have become more conscious about trying to formulate a coherent and consistent set of messages about their country.

These diverse geographies and cultures of propaganda take root in a variety of practices and institutions from book distribution to filmmaking and from churches to schools, as our second section of essays explores. In some cases, the means for instilling beliefs and values are as simple as a classroom blackboard and some chalk. But, as Craig Kridel shows in his essay tracing a series of pedagogic debates in the United States, this apparent simplicity belies a complex history that extends back to John Dewey's writing on public schooling in the 1930s. Recognizing that a teacher's imposition of values is unconscious and that indoctrination is often an unavoidable aspect of education, Progressives and subsequent reformers deliberated the degree to which

fostering democratic values that the U.S. government distributed fifty million volumes worldwide during the 1950s alone. Trysh Travis contextualizes this staggering statistic in her examination of the professional "bookmen" of the Cold War who peddled books internationally as a way of conveying democratic ideas that might counter the influence of Soviet ideology. Shifting from the dissemination of print to the spread of propaganda across the airwaves, the next essay by Michele Hilmes focuses on radio broadcasting in the first half of the twentieth century. Her analysis of the origins of the Voice of America and the BBC's Empire Service points to the need for reexamining conventional definitions of communications practice, objectivity, and documentary form.

Cinema made the tense relationships between documentary and propaganda still more fraught and uncertain. Examining Bolshevik propaganda during the Russian Civil War, John MacKay describes how the filming of the forcible exposure of the supposedly incorruptible remains of saints supported a militantly atheistic perspective. Even though the camera purports to offer objective evidence, Soviet filmmakers employed visual falsifications similar to the ones that they found so contemptible when practiced by religious institutions. For Thomas Elsaesser, comparable issues surface in German documentary films of the 1930s, which employed the affective and rhetorical power of cinema to record—as well as shape and manipulate—portraits of urban life including factory work, sports, and hygiene. These practices included the techniques of Nazi fascist propaganda, which, as Lawrence Samuel contends in his essay, reappeared in American advertising and consumer culture of the 1950s. The intent was primarily conservative, an attempt to "bring order out of chaos," as public relations expert Edward Bernays put it. Yet such propaganda practices could often be pleasurable, as Mark Wollaeger reminds us. Moving from Freud to theorists of the Frankfurt School, he argues that propaganda targets and very frequently satisfies the needs of modern citizens. No one appreciated this appeal of mass persuasion better than novelist James Joyce, who, as Wollaeger shows, sought to represent multiple forms of pleasure in an effort to mimic but also disrupt propaganda's persuasive appeal during the era of modernism.

Propaganda has been a long-standing concern for theorists as well as artists, educators, and advertisers, as our third section of essays brings to light. In the immediate wake of World War I and the dissolution of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) that was set up to promote the war, intellectuals begin seriously contemplating the effects of propaganda in molding democratic public opinion. The inquiry was led by Walter Lippmann, whose career as an ardent supporter of President Woodrow Wilson's administration, army propagandist, and subsequently critic of media complicity in censorship is carefully traced by Sue Curry Jansen. As Debra Hawhee analyzes in her essay, this exploration of propaganda and its discontents was further pursued in the 1930s (on the eve of another world war) by rhetorician Kenneth Burke, whose sophisticated theorizing recast the discussion by emphasizing the complex processes of identification between persuaders and those persuaded. A further shift away from political explanations regarding the efficacy of propaganda toward psychological and sociological accounts is marked by the

anxieties regarding the dominance of technique in modern society, whether democratic or totalitarian. More recently literary theorist Paul de Man endeavored to relocate propaganda and its ideological effects as centrally an aesthetic question linked to problems of reading, as Sara Guyer discusses in her analysis of de Man's posthumous essay on Joseph Goebbels's misreading of Friedrich Schiller's misreading of Kant.

While it remains challenging to theorize the present, the trio of essays that close our volume offer a bracing array of methodological approaches to understanding the role of propaganda in shaping contemporary events around the globe. In his examination of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, David Yanagizawa-Drott sets out to measure the results of state-sponsored propaganda on political violence by statistically correlating "hate radio" patterns of dissemination with the literacy rates of various villages within the radio station's broadcast range to understand how education levels might influence the reception of mass media. Megan Boler and Selena Nemorin closely scrutinize the mainstream press and Internet coverage of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, as well as the formation, mainly in cyberspace, of a counterpublic sphere responding to and participating in this new information environment. An implicit question of their analysis is how students and critics of propaganda studies might begin to distinguish the methods of state-directed misinformation conveyed by corporate media from the tactics employed by digital dissenters. In a similar vein, Sahar Khamis, Paul Gold, and Katherine Vaughn seek to chart and comprehend the fluid dynamics of mass persuasion during the "Arab Awakening" of 2011, investigating how various actors deploying certain tactics and tools (such as social media) within specific contexts competed for power.

Taken together, the chapters in this volume reveal the endeavor of propaganda studies to be varied and conflicting, taking new forms and adapting new practices in response to changing geographies, institutions, and histories. This set of challenges does more than suggest the richness of the field; it suggests its continued relevance for the future.

Notes

1. Adam Clarke, *The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The text carefully printed from the most correct copies of the present Authorized Version. Including the marginal readings and parallel texts. With a Commentary and Critical Notes.* Designed as a help to a better understanding of the sacred writings (1810–1826). Available at http://www.studylight.org/com/acc/.
2. January 1792, *Gazette de Paris.* Cited in Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 41.
3. Georg Lukács, *The Historical Novel,* trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), 23–24.
4. Orwell seemed to have come to a similar conclusion, because in the very next sentence of his diary entry he concedes, "I don't think this matters so long as one knows what one is doing, and why."
5. *Propaganda Analysis: A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze*

6. See, for instance, Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); and Henry Jenkins, *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide* (New York: NYU Press, 2006).
7. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*, trans. Reginald Snell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 32.
8. Slavoj Žižek, "Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology," *Mapping Ideology*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1994), 7.
9. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York: Henry Holt, 1927), 110.
10. Walter Lippmann, *Liberty and the News* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 5.
11. Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society (The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 1)* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).

PART I

HISTORIES AND NATIONALITIES